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The Story of Upjohn Co. v.
United States: One Man's
Journey to Extend LawyerClient Confidentiality, and
the Social Forces That
Affected It
Paul Roths te in*
The attorney-client privilege protects information a client provides
an attorney in confidence for the purpose of securing legal advice . But
suppose the client is not a person but a corporation and can only speak
through its agents and employees. What then are the contours of the
privilege? If the corporation's attorney asks an employee for information
relating to pending litigation or other legal matters, is the conversation
privileged? Some courts said that no communications to a corporate
attorney were privileged unless they came from members of the corporate control group, loosely those people who had authority to direct the
attorney's activities in connection with legal matters. Other courts said
that the identity of the communicator was less important than the
subject matter of the communication, and that even the communications
of a lower level employee to corporate counsel would be protected, if they
pertained to the employee's duties, if they were relevant to the corporation 's need for legal advice, and if the employee had been directed by
appropriate corporate authority to speak to counsel on the matter.
Suppose that you were counsel to a major corporation , and you
wanted to investigate a matter that might have serious legal ramifications for your company, where many of the facts were in the possession
of lower-echelon field employees. How would you proceed? What communications would you expect to be protected? Would you fight the matter
all the way to the Supreme Court if the lower courts ordered you to
* P rofessor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
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share with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) your notes of confidential
communications between you and these employees? Gerard Thomas
proceeded with great care to build the stron gest case possible for
claiming the privilege, and when two lower courts refused that claim, he
appealed-successfully-to the United States Supreme Court, forever
changing what corporate communications are privileged and the way
corporate law is practiced. The case was Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449
U.S. 383 (1981).

THE CASE AND ITS DRAMATIS PERSONAE
Gerard Thomas today is just over 80 years old. At 6 ft. 2 inches, he
still cuts a handsom e figure, topped with an impressive man e of white
hair.1 Officially retired less than five year s ago from his private law firm
in Kalamazoo, Michigan, Thomas is still found at meetings there on a
fair ly regular basis. He remains married to the same woman, after all
these years. She, like his friends at the office, calls him " Gerry" . He
dotes on his two grown daughters and a son-none of whom are
lawyers-and eight grandchildren, two of whom just graduated from
college.
There is something Clark Kent-ish about Thomas. A true gentleman, he is polite, soft spoken, and courtly. It is hard to believe that
twenty-odd years ago he doggedly faced down the IRS, winning such a
dramatic expansion of attorney-client privilege in the process, that even
today he is deemed a hero by the legal community.
Indeed, the IRS probably thought from his demeanor that Thomas
would be a push-over. They were wrong. If you listen closely when he
talks, there are glimpses of the man of steel within. This veteran WWII
infantry corporal didn 't win two battle stars and a purple heart for
nothing.
At t he time of the fight with the IRS, Thomas was General Counsel,
Vice President, and Secretary of the great American pharmaceutical
firm , the Upjohn Company. H e was also on the boards of several of its
subsidiaries. Headquartered in Kalamazoo, where Thomas still lives,
U pj ohn had world-spanning operations in over 150 countries, requiring
Thomas to travel from time-to-time to consult with overseas employees.
The attorney-client victory he won in the Upjohn case involved his
communications with som e of these overseas employees-communicat My descriptions of Gera rd Thomas, his involvement in the case, and other matters
related t o the case, are based on my personal interviews with Thomas and others connected
wit h the case, and on court records, press accoun ts, corporate documents, and information
fro m government filings, some obta ined through the Freedom of Information Act, as well
as more traditiona l legal and internet sources. David Sinkman, my student research
assistant, a ided me in various ways, and I am grateful for his help.
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tions the IRS badly wanted to discover in order to determine Upjohn's
tax liability.
The precise issue in the case was whether the company's attorneyclient privilege covered written and oral exchanges between Thomas and
lower-echelon Upjohn employees-field employees in various parts of the
world who, unlike certain officers and directors, were not part of the
company's " control group". It was undisputed, owing to previous cases,
that an attorney's communications with members of the control group
itself, being most like an individual client's communications with her
attorney in the non-corporate context, were privileged, assuming other
privilege requirements were met.
Thomas prevailed in the Supreme Court. The lower-echelon communications were held sacrosanct, ushering in an era of increased confidentiality and reliance on attorneys by the business community. Whether a
lawyer was an " in-house" lawyer, like Thomas, or one hired externally
by the corporation made no difference.
The Upjohn decision has particular resonance today, when corporate
fraud and the role of lawyers in facilitating or preventing it, is so much
on the front burner. Recent abuses by executives in charge of such
leviathons as Enron Corp., Tyco, MCI-Worldcom, and Health-South,
have resulted in massive corporate bankruptcies and huge financial
losses to employees, shareholders, and investors. Individual, institutional, and governmental retirement funds have been decimated. The entire
national economy has suffered. Enron alone is estimated to have cost
investors over 63 billion dollars. Does an expansive corporate attorneyclient privilege impede discovery of fraud and enable lawyers to help
engineer legal circumventions? Or does it encourage companies and their
employees to lay the facts fully before the attorney so she can advise
them to stay within the law? The Supreme Court in Upjohn believed the
latter to be a more significant effect, saying:
The narrow scope given the attorney-client privilege by the court
below not only makes it difficult for corporate attorneys to formulate sound advice when their client is faced with a specific legal
problem, but also threatens to limit the valuable efforts of corporate
counsel to ensure their client's compliance with the law. In light of
the vast and complicated array of regulatory legislation confronting
the modern corporation, corporations, unlike most individuals, constantly go to lawyers to find out how to obey the law, particularly
since compliance with the law in this area is hardly an instinctive
matter. [For just one example,] the behavior proscribed by [the
antitrust laws] is often difficult to distinguish from the gray zone of
socially acceptable and economically justifiable business conduct. 2
2

Upjohn, 449 U .S. at 392 (internal quotation marks a nd citations omitted).
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Government enforcers and regulators have a less charitable view of
lawyers and recently have taken some counter-measures. We shall return to this later.
Thomas' involvement with the events giving rise to Upjohn began in
1976. Independent accountants conducting a routine audit had alerted
Upjohn that some of Upjohn 's subsidiaries abroad or their employees
may h ave made payments to foreign officials or governments in order to
secure or facilitate business for Upjohn. Since Upjohn 's foreign subsidiaries were in many r espect s independent entities, Upjohn 's International Division first looked into the matter without Thomas' direct participation . But that inquiry did not come up with much . Since there were
some aspects that might affect Upjohn on a broader basis, Thomas got
more intimately involved.
He does not remember precisely how it first came to his personal
attention that Upjohn 's subsidiaries might be involved in questionable
payments, or how he initially felt . It is likely he was notified by the
company's chief financial officer, who may have approached him at the
water cooler, in the hall, or over lunch in the executive dining room. A
more formal memo would have followed . Several things undoubtedly
flashed through Thomas's mind. That American companies and their
subsidiaries were making such payments was not news . The practice was
beginning to be discussed in business circles and, very disparagingly, by
the press. Congress was considering legislation to curb the payments,
and something called the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was eventually
passed, but too late to affect this case. However, there already were laws
on the books that made such payments potentially illegal at home and
abroad.
Thomas obviously knew the realities . Foreign governmental entities
often purchased American products, including pharmaceuticals, for their
populations, or r equired that official permission be obtained to sell
through other channels. Formal or informal fees , legally authorized or
not, were frequ ently exacted as a prerequisite to doing such business.
International competition for these lucrative marketing opportunities
was intense . Many companies or their employees believed that paying
informal " fees" was necessary for American firms to stay competitive. In
som e instances it was not clear whether the payments were illegal
bribes, or a form of "cu stomary law"-that is, an informal license fee
that was an accepted part of doing business in the country. Just as
formally prescribed license fees could be properly paid, so could these,
the argument went- particularly in a country where there was little
formal law or where the line between formal law and customary practice
was blurry. Some of these informal payments might appear to be part of
the understood "salary" for otherwise low-paid or unpaid officials, much
like the theoretically optional but universally expected tip one gives to
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waiters in a restaurant. There were other ambiguities as well: Was
treating an official to dinner at a fine restaurant, or giving him or his
family a small gift, improper? Would it be considered impolite not to do
so? How large or lavish must a dinner or gift be to be improper? But not
everything was in the gray area. Clearly, there were circumstances
where everyone should realize that a payment because of its size,
expected benefit, or recipient, was flat out wrong.
Thomas also knew that this was the immediate post-Watergate era.
A candidate for U.S. President named Jimmy Carter was running on a
platform calling for a "return to ethics," and it was all but certain he
would win. American politicians and corporate executives were facing
public anger over secret political contributions and corporate bribery at
home and abroad. The press, public, and government investigators were
keen to discover more Watergate-like scandals. "Bananagate", for example, revealed that the United Fruit Company, the world 's predominant
supplier of bananas, was bribing officials in tropical countries where
bananas were grown. United Fruit and other companies were found to
have maintained unaccounted-for "slush" funds-likened to President
Nixon 's famous slush fund that had financed the Watergate break-in.
These corporate slush funds were used to bribe and make under-thetable political contributions to domestic and foreign politicians. Companies were getting into trouble with the IRS and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), for not properly disclosing the payments
or their true nature to regulators, for deducting them from income, and
for failing to report or identify them (or the foreign and domestic civil
and criminal liabilities they potentially entailed) to investors, as required
by American law. Currency regulations and foreign laws were also being
violated. If Upjohn were making payments to foreign officials, it would
be viewed very much askance, to say the least.
Thomas called a meeting with Ray ("Ted") Parfet, Jr. , Upjohn's
Chairman of the Board, and others in the company. In a move to fend off
possible legal trouble as well as a public relations nightmare, they
launched an internal investigation into these questionable payments. It
would cover the preceding several years through to the present. Thomas
was in charge. He was assisted by an in-house staff of three or four
lawyers, a secretary, and a couple of part-time paralegals. Because
foreign payments could affect Upjohn 's federal securities and tax obligations, Thomas called upon the old-line patrician Washington D.C. law
firm of Covington & Burling, specialists who over the years had assisted
Upjohn 's legal department in federal matters. They could now help
structure the investigation and help prepare oral and written questions
to ask the foreign employees.
Thomas says these questions were structured not as much to preserve a possible future attorney-client privilege claim, as to get the facts

156

THE STORY OF UPJOHN CO. u. UNITED STATES

o that Upjohn and their subsidiaries could comply with domestic and
foreign legal requirements.
The investigation included written questionnaires and letters sent to
" All Foreign General and Area Managers" . They were signed by Parfet.
These questionnaires addressed "possibly illegal payments to foreign
government officials" and solicited all information relating to any such
payments. The letters informed the managers of Thomas ' leading role in
conducting the investigation and instructed that all responses should be
sent directly to him . Because the inquiry was " highly confidential" the
managers were told to restrict the information to as few Upjohn employee a nece sary. By thus underlining the role of Thomas, his status as
exclusive recipient of responses, the legal purposes of the investigation,
the restricted confidential nature of the communications, and the employees' authorization by the corporation to speak to its counsel, Thomas
and Covington enhanced the likelihood that the communications would
be held privileged in any future challenge, as well as the likelihood
employees would make significant disclosures.
Another part of the investigation included live interviews, mostly
conducted by Thomas personally, of the foreign managers and thirtythree other employees. He traveled to approximately fifteen or twenty
different developed and underdeveloped countries-places in Mexico,
Central and South America, Europe, Asia, and Africa-to speak with
employees who made or knew of payments. The trips, often arduous,
lasted for weeks or even months. Once, in Egypt, Thomas was jailed
overnight for not having the right medical inoculations. Coming from a
company that manufactured them, he should have been more savvy. But
he had overlooked the fact that, because he stopped to do interviews in
Kenya before going on to Egypt, he needed more shots than if he had
come straight from the U.S. He was told he was being taken to a Holiday
Inn, but it turned out to be a jail. The only resemblance to a Holiday Inn
was the guards' green blazers, Thomas says. He was more than a little
frightened by their machine guns and the fact that an Ethiopian in his
cell said he had been there for days for a similar infraction
Thomas wanted to do most of the oral interviews personally. This
certainly would increase the credibility of any future claim of attorneyclient privilege, but he says that was not his only purpose. As in the
written questionnaires, he wanted to assure the employees that they
could be forthright with him, despite any self-damaging revelations,
because the company would do all it could to protect them. His subsequent fight for confidentiality, all the way to the Supreme Court,
suggest s his promise was not empty.
Thomas's approach in the interviews emphasized that the company
valued its employees, had always treated them fairly, regarded them in
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many respects as family, and would be loyal. He told them he knew they
had been trying to help the company, but that now the company needed
their assistance in the investigation. He says today that for the most
part, employees trusted the company. It had been founded near the turn
of the century by an honorable pillar of the Kalamazoo community, Dr.
William Erastus Upjohn, who had achieved wealth by inventing the
friable pill, the key to modern pharmaceuticals.3 Dr. Upjohn, himself the
son of a respected local doctor, went on to become one of the country's
great philanthropists. The Upjohn family remained involved in the
ownership and management of the company, and continued and expanded the great philanthropic tradition of Dr. Upjohn. The company, Thomas says, always put a high value on integrity, and the employees knew
that. So they cooperated. No doubt, "Gerry" Thomas's extremely personable nature had a lot to do with it.
Many of the employees abroad told him that, if you were doing
business in their country, you must pay somebody, especially in the
social services and health field. They said often there was no real
government to deal with . Doing business was prevented by somebody
unless " palms were greased" . In many instances, he was told, it was
hard to tell whether someone seeking payments and in a position to
impede business was a governmental agent or a private party. Yet the
legality of the payment under both foreign and U.S . law might hinge on
that.
Some of the payments he was told about seemed relatively insignificant. In Mexico, for example, " government" drivers of company employees would get lost or delayed unless an amount, ranging from $2 to $20
was added to the charge under the table. In some countries, he was told,
one had to be careful not to "tip" too much, or "you would look
ignorant". Frequently, the amount had to be big enough for the recipient
to divide with others. Sometimes payments were "in kind". For example,
company employees may have had to see that someone in a key position
got a telephone installed in their home.
But many of the stories he heard undoubtedly involved more significant payments, to people as low on the chain as purchasing agents, or as
high as the head of a major governmental department, or even higher, in
more questionable circumstances. Thomas does not feel free to talk
about those. But he says he told the employees that the questionable
payments must stop.
3 A fri ab le pill is dissolvable, made of compacted powder. P rev iously, pills were
unyieldi ngly hard, passing t hro ugh the bodily system undissolved. Medicine had to be
administered in liquid form . Dr. Upjohn 's ma rketing to doctors involved send ing a ha mmer
and two pills on a board-one friable, one not- a nd inviting the doctor to hammer t hem
both. One wo uld smash into powder, one would dent t he board. The logo of t he Upjohn
Company fo r ma ny years was a tiny depiction of this ha mmer-and-board experim ent .
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Some of the employees Thomas interviewed had felt that they
houldn 't bother their employer about the payments made to grease the
wheels of business. They felt they were protecting Upjohn. If told, the
company might have to halt the practice, costing it business and putting
it at a competitive disadvantage. But many of these same employees
seemed relieved that the company had now found out and wanted to
know more.
There was a feeling on the part of some of those Thomas interviewed that "everybody does it- it is a part of the culture of this
country-penaltie against it are not enforced-you cannot practicably
apply U.S. tandards here." It may also be supposed that at least some
employees themselves benefited, as employees, from the increased sales,
in terms of commissions, promotion, or the like. There was little suggestion, though , that any employees got direct kickbacks.
Upon their return to the United States, Thomas and his staff put
togeth er provisional materials about the payments based on his notes of
the interviews and the answers to the written interrogatories. (It is the
privileged status of these notes and answers that subsequently became
the main subject of the Upjohn case. But we are getting ahead of the
story. )
The SEC was investigating foreign payments generally, and may
have gotten wind of the fact that Upjohn might be involved. Under SEC
disclosure regulations, such payments, and potential legal liabilities
connected with them, had to be clearly reported and identified in
shareholder and other material. Few companies, including Upjohn, had
done so, often being ignorant of the payments or their true nature. Some
companies, however , were purposely covering up.
Thomas and Covington & Burling consulted and decided that early
disclosure to the SEC of what Upjohn 's investigation had found would
mitigate whatever penalties the SEC might ultimately impose on them
for violation of these reporting requirements over the last several years.
Stanley Sporkin-subsequently General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency and later a Federal District Judge in Washington, D.Cwas the head of enforcement at the SEC at the time. He had instituted a
policy encouraging early cooperation and disclosure by a company, of
possible law infraction s, even in advance of any SEC investigation. He
would reward such self-reporting with a reduction or elimination of any
penalties the company might eventually face . He fe lt this would supplement his own resou rces, greatly expanding the number of potential
violations the SEC could feasibly and economically investigate. In addition to gen erally publicizing his policy, he went so far as to send letters
to companies h e su spected of violations, urging them to investigate and
report on themselves. Sporkin, known as a "Washington wunderkind,"
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is credited with the first large-scale program encouraging such selfinvestigation and self-reporting. It has since been widely copied and
expanded by other agencies. Today, Sporkin-an enthusiastic and tirelessly energetic person- has r etired from the bench and is practicing in
a Washington, D.C. law firm that, perhaps ironically, is handling the
bankruptcy of Enron .
After ubstantial input by Covington & Burling and others in
Upjohn, a summary report of some of Thomas's findings, based on some
of his notes and som e of the interrogatory answers, was produced and
submitted to the SEC on the appropriate official forms, with a copy to
the IRS. It included only summaries of those transactions the lawyers
representing Upjohn felt wer e relevant. The company's disclosures appeared to be motivated in part by Sporkin's promise of more lenient
treatment for voluntary compliance and Thomas's own conviction that
early disclosure is best.
The SEC ultimately seemed satisfied with this material, after som e
supplemental disclosures.
The IRS , however, took a firmer stance and soon began investigating the tax consequences of the questionable payments. For example,
were paym ents deducted from Upjohn 's income when they sh ould not
have been? As part of its inquiry, the IRS demanded production of " all
files r elevant to the investigation conducted under the supervision of
Gerard Thomas to identify payments to employees of foreign govern ments and any political contributions made by the Upjohn Company or
any of its affiliates." The IRS also specifically asked for the answers to
t he written questionnaires and all memos or notes of all Thom as's
interviews. At first the requests were made only in letters and discu ssions with Thomas and Covington & Burling. Upjohn declined to produce t he answers and interview materials, claiming that the attorneyclient privilege protected them, but the company offered to make people
they had interviewed available for interrogation about the facts t hat t hey
knew (as opposed to what they told attorneys about them ), not a large
concession since such information is not protected by the attorney-client
privilege anyway.
The IRS then turned up the h eat , issuing a "summons" for the
refused information. A special statute and accompanying regulations
permit this IRS summons procedure. Only a few agencies can issue such
summonses. They are supposed to be issued only in connection wit h civil
investigations (which, so far , this was) but are not invalidated by the fact
that, as here, the possibility of using the information summoned in
subsequent criminal proceedings has not been ruled out. Tax infractions
can lead to either civil or criminal proceedings, depending upon how
aggravated and intentional they prove to be.
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Technically, an IRS summons is issued and signed by the special
agent in charge of the investigation. In this case, the special agent was
David Nowak, a tough, uncompromising, no-nonsense enforcer of fearome reputation who was not satisfied with the voluntary disclosures
that had been made by Upjohn . His summons was addressed to Thomas
and Upjohn by name. They refused to comply with it. Under the statute,
the special agent can then go to the Federal District Court to get the
ummons enforced with a court order that, if violated, results in punishment.
On August 31 , 1977, Agent Nowak requested the United States
District Court for the Western District of Michigan to enforce the
summons and compel production of the documents. As customary, the
caption of the case prominently bore Agent Nowak's name as the party
eeking enforcement, and the names of Gerard Thomas and Upjohn as
the parties resisting enforcement. This is the case that ultimately went
to the Supreme Court.
In the District Court in cases of this kind, a Magistrate-an assistant to the District Judge-normally hears the case first . The Magistrate
listens to witnesses, examines documentary evidence, and considers
points of law raised by both sides, and then makes a recommendation to
the District Judge, supported by detailed reasoning, concerning whether
or not to enforce the summons. The District Judge can adopt, reject, or
modify the recommendation. Sometimes the Judge takes additional
evidence, or sends the case back to the Magistrate to hear more evidence
or make additional findings or clarifications. After the District Judge
finally rules, a dissatisfied party can appeal to the Court of Appeals, and
thereafter to the Supreme Court, if the Supreme Court thinks the issue
is important enough.
Upjohn and Thomas were represented before the Magistrate by local
Michigan counsel and Covington & Burling, since Upjohn's in-house
lawyers did not try cases. However, some in-house lawyers on Thomas's
staff who had participated in strategy sessions were at counsel table and
on the papers. The lawyers argued attorney-client privilege, work-product, and some minor points of statutory and regulatory authority. The
privilege against self-incrimination was not invoked because corporations
and corporate officials have no such privilege covering corporate documents.
Agent Nowak explained in testimony before the Magistrate why he
was not satisfied with only the disclosures Upjohn had voluntarily made
to the IRS (basically the summaries of some of the transactions Upjohn 's
investigation had discovered that had been given to the SEC). Like any
tough law enforcer, Nowak did not want to take Upjohn 's word for which
transactions and details were relevant and what their import was:

PAUL ROTHSTEIN

161

Q. [By Government Attorney]: Why do you feel that you should
have these documents .. . rather than take the Upjohn Company's
assurance as to what the relevance of those documents [is]?
A. [By Nowak]: Well, I feel that those file s may contain evidence
that would indicate that there is in fact a tax implication involved in
payments which the company has alleged have no U.S. tax implication. These files may contain leads or other evidence that would
have a relationship to those payments that the company does admit
have a U.S. tax implication. I believe that it would-if it served no
other purpose--it would help me corroborate the company 's position
that there is no tax impact, if that is what the facts would show
upon my investigation of the files.
Thomas himself appeared as the other principal witness. He testifi ed
regarding the physical events of the investigation, including his trips and
the sending of the questionnaires. He characterized his interview notes
as follows:
My notes would contain what I considered to be the important
questions, the substance of the responses to them , my beliefs as to
the importance of these, my beliefs as to how they related to the
inquiry, my thoughts as to how they r elated to other questions. In
some instances they might even suggest other questions that I
would have to ask, or things that I needed to find elsewhere. They
were more than just a verbatim report of my conversation with
the--a report of my conversation in the interviews.
He reiterated that Upjohn would voluntarily make current employees available to the IRS for questioning except for those Upjohn deemed
totally irrelevant. But Upjohn declined to absorb travel expenses the IRS
might incur in such interviews. Moreover, some of the people involved
were former employees that Upjohn could no longer produce. But none
of this would necessarily prevent the IRS from using its own resources
and auspices to obtain interviews. Interviewing witnesses would of
course be more difficult and expensive than examining the documents,
and the IRS could not be sure the witnesses would be as frank as they
had been in Thomas' inquiry.
The Magistrate ruled in the government's favor, giving several
grounds: the privilege applies only to communications of the control
group, and anyway the limited disclosures to the SEC and IRS had the
effect of waiving the privilege as to almost everything that had been
communicated, whether that was intended or not.4 The District Judge
4 The Magistrate also ru led that the work-product doctrine did not apply to material
requested in an IRS summons, but if it did , it was overcome by the IRS' need for the
information.
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ummarily adopted the Magistrate's opinion in all respects and ordered
production of the allegedly protected material.
On Thomas's and Covington's recommendation, Upjohn appealed to
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which rejected the lower
court's finding of waiver, holding that waiver only occurred as to
information actually given to the IRS and SEC-a very narrow waiver
that ound like it should have been good news for Upjohn .
But the Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court that the
privilege did not apply "to the extent the communications were made by
officers and agents not responsible for directing Upjohn 's actions in
re ponse to legal advice"-virtually all the communications at issue
here-because these communications, being made by people not in the
corporate " control group," were not made as part of any attorney-client
relationship. The Court of Appeals was worried that extending the
privilege further, as some Courts of Appeals had done, would encourage
upper-echelon management to ignore unpleasant facts and would create
a broad " zone of silence." 5 So, although Upjohn may not have waived its
privilege, as to most of the material there was no privilege to be waived
to begin with. This was a crushing loss.
Upjohn had been roundly defeated twice: in the trial court, and in
the appeals court. A lesser man than Thomas might have caved. But he
knew there was one last chance to preserve the confidentiality of the
information he had collected, and he convinced the company to take it.
That last chance was to persuade the United States Supreme Court,
first, to take the case, and second, to address the merits of the case and
reverse the Court of Appeals' decision.
Upjohn's strongest argument for taking the case was that a conflict
of authority existed among lower courts on the question of who in a
corporation may make privileged communications to the corporation's
attorney. In advancing this argument, Upjohn stressed the legal profession's urgent need to know precisely the scope of the attorney-client
privilege in the corporate context.
5 The Court of Appeals also agreed with the lower court that work-product protection
did not apply. The decision did not directly address whether someone other than top
execu ti ves in Upjohn might be considered in a co nt rol group of sort --e.g., regio nal
managers who migh t have a uth ority to act on legal advice relating to their own regions.
This possibility had been recognized by some decision . Nor did t he decision discuss
whether investigating for eign payments was more a business functi on t ha n a profess ional
legal functio n, which wo uld st rip communications related t hereto of atto rn ey-client privilege. This possibili ty has been considered in other unrelated cases, particula rly where the
lawyer wears two hats, as Thomas did ; t ha t is, holds a legal position a nd a business
position in t he compa ny. The in vestigation here had been constructed in a way that would
maxim ize t he cla im t hat legal co ncerns were for emost.
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Thomas and Covington were pleased but not really surprised when
the Supreme Court "granted certiorari"-that is, agreed to hear the
case-because it is well known that the Justices like to resolve important
conflicts among the Federal Circuits. Resolving such conflicts is one of
the most important functions of the Court and a primary reason the
Court gives for reviewing lower court decisions.

UNDERCUTTING AN ANCIENT PRIVILEGE
To understand the Supreme Court's ultimate decision on the merits
of the case, we first need to review a few basics about the privilege.
The attorney-client privilege provides that, with certain exceptions,
confidential communications between an attorney and her client are not
to be received as evidence in judicial and similar proceedings. Originally
based on a notion of the lawyer's honor (a gentleman would not reveal
the confidences of another), today the privilege is supported on other
grounds. Combined with the roughly parallel ethical obligation of attorney not to disclose client information in venues outside of those covered
by privilege, the privilege is believed to encourage clients to truthfully
reveal to the attorney everything the client knows that might bear on
the legal advice sought by the client, regardless of whether the advice is
sought to prepare for litigation or for other legal purposes. The lawyer's
ability to provide sound legal advice is thought to provide a number of
social benefits that more than compensate for any loss of evidence-not
the least of which is that the lawyer may be able to avert illegal action by
the client. It is also argued that courts and other public entities make
better decisions if they are presented with fully informed legal arguments, and when clients tell their lawyers everything, sounder legal
documents and transactions also result.
From at least the early 19th century on there have been scholars
who have wanted to abolish or restrict the privilege, including the
celebrated philosopher Jeremy Bentham, who, in Rationale of Judicial
Evidence (1827), authored a particularly scathing critique. However, the
privilege has withstood most assaults. Its roots are deep. They stretch
back at least to the reign of Elizabeth I, and some scholar think the
privilege may be traced as far back as the Roman Empire, where the
notion that a lawyer could not be a witness against his client was an
accepted principle.
Courts developed the attorney-client privilege for the individual
client. The rise of the modern corporation has created enormous problems in identifying the client for purposes of the privilege. Unlike an
individual person, a corporation is an artificial body lacking the human
dignity and personal rights that the privilege seeks to protect. While
attorneys generally rely on the individual client as the sole source of
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information about their case, a corporation has many individual workers,
from the factory worker to the door-to-door salesman to the chief
executive, each with his or her own story to tell. As corporations grew in
ize and complexity during the 20th century, information and responsibility were dispersed across the globe. Thus questions arise in the
corporate context that do not exist with individual clients. As a result,
American courts have struggled, particularly since the 1960s, to define
the cope of this privilege as it relates to corporations. While it is
generally agreed that in most circumstances only those who run the
corporation can claim (or waive) the privilege, there has been substantially le agreement on the range of protected communications. Before
Upjohn, courts and commentators frequently asked, " Does the privilege
protect communications between every employee and the corporation's
lawyers? Or does the privilege only protect communications between
executives and corporate counsel? Or is the answer somewhere inbetween?"
In a landmark 1962 utilities antitrust case known as Radiant
Burners, Chief Judge Campbell of the United States District Court for
t he Northern District of Illinois ruled that letters from corporate officers
and employees sent to the corporation 's lawyers were not privileged and
must be produced during discovery. Judge Campbell reasoned that the
attorney-client privilege was (1) historically and fundamentally personal
in nature and (2) the lack of confidentiality inherent in a corporate
hierarchy diminishes the force of the privilege. As a result, he ruled
against extending the privilege to corporations. Prior to Judge Campbell 's decision, courts made no distinction between individuals and
corporations in applying this privilege. All that was required for the
privilege was that the information furnished to the attorney by any
officer or employee must be given in confidence and without the presence of a third person .
The legal backlash to Judge Campbell's decision was swift. The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the ruling. Radiant
Burners, Inc. u. American Gas Assn., 320 F.2d 314 (1963). Citing a
number of early U.S. and English cases, this court, sitting en bane, held
that a corporation is entitled to the same treatment as any other client.
The court stressed the need to encourage full disclosure by clients to
their lawyers, reasoning that such communication is essential for a
lawyer to be effective as counsel. Although Judge Campbell 's decision
was overturned and most courts and legislatures showed little inclination to embrace his decision , his opinion struck a cord with many
commentators and sparked a fierce legal debate.
Challenged by Judge Campbell 's reasoning, courts were forced to fall
back on a utilitarian rationale for the privilege, as articulated by the
Seventh Circuit in Radiant Burners, to support their extension of the
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privilege to corporations. But Judge Campbell had alerted them that
there ar e serious arguments against a corporate privilege. The response
of some was a compromise of sorts: the control group test , first developed in City of Philadelphia u. Westing house Electric Corp ., 210 F . Supp.
483 (E .D. P a. 1962), only months after Judge Campbell 's decision . AB put
forth in City of Philadelphia , the control group test enabled courts to
extend the privilege to corpora tions, but in a sharply limited form .
Under this test , a communication is protected if the person speaking or
writing is in a " position to control or even to take a substantial part in a
decision about any action which the corporation may t ake upon the
advice of the attorney. " This control group t est was quickly accepted
around the country . In fact, the drafters of the Federal Rules of E vidence
r ecommended the control group test in their original proposal for the
Rules.
The development of the control group test was driven by several
concerns. First , extending the privilege to statements m ade by all witnesses seemed contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Hickman u.
Taylor, 329 U.S . 495 (1947). Under Hickman , an attorney's m ental
impressions and free exchanges between clients and lawyers ar e protect ed but t he knowledge of witnesses to disputed events is not protect ed,
and they must provide all relevant information. Given the structure of
t he modern corporation , many employees with relevant or incriminating
info rmation ar e not corporate executives and thus are arguably m or e
like wit nesses than clients. The control group t est was intended to limit
t he privilege to only those who were most like " clients,'' i.e. , t hose who
could act on the attorney's advice-the senior executives-rather than to
protect all workers who knew damaging information (arguably mor e like
''witnesses' ').
A second concern that the control group test took into account was a
corpor ation 's ability to manipulate an expansive attorney-client pr ivilege
so as to protect embarrassing or incriminating documents. U nlike an
individual, a corpora te client could structure its procedures so as to
privilege much of its documentation relating to routine transactions by
addressing it t o counsel. Thus, the control group t est was intended to
remove routine intra-corporate communications from the pr ivilege's
protection . Commentators noted, h owever , that ther e wer e other fea tures of t he attorney-client privilege that could partially mitigate t his
problem . For example, communications and documents, to be privileged,
must have been created in connection with the r endition of legal services
rather t han for business or criminal purposes. Nevertheless, a broad
attorney-client privilege for corporations is of legitimate concern, in that
it can deprive courts of vast amounts of informa tion .
Third, the control group test took into account the n eed for a brightline rule. Uncertainty about the exact limits of the privilege would er ode
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full communication between clients and their lawyers because of fears
that the conversation would eventually be disclosed. By limiting the
privilege to the small group of senior managers who control decisionmaking, the control group test was intended to allow corporations to
identify easily those whose communications were protected by the privilege. Some commentators noted, however, that uncertainty about who is
within the control group was inevitable. A broader test embracing all
employees might be more certain. Leaving the matter open without any
test is what produced the uncertainty.
The control group test was greeted with widespread acceptance and
was applied in all federal courts until 1970 when the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit challenged this approach in Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487. The Seventh Circuit, apparently
again indulging its inclination in favor of a corporate attorney-client
privilege that it had manifested in Radiant Burners, adopted a broader
te t for determining the scope of the corporate attorney-client privilege.
It focused on the subject matter of the employee's communications
rather than on the position of the employee who was communicating the
information. Under the subject matter test, an employee's communication with the corporation's lawyer is privileged when made at the
direction of a superior and when the subject matter upon which the
attorney's advice is sought concerns the worker's employment.
The reasoning behind this broader interpretation was clear. Opponents of the control group test argued that only by extending the
privilege to low-level employees could attorneys adequately advise their
corporate clients. To restrict the privilege only to communications by
top-level executives was to ignore the realities of corporate life because
executives often lack the information needed by attorneys to formulate
sound legal advice.
The subject matter test's emphasis on ensuring effective legal advice
won many adherents, and when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Harper & Row it was thought that the choice between the control group
and subject matter tests would soon be made . However, the Court, being
shy one member, divided four to four on the issue, resulting in a
summary affirmation without opinion, of the Seventh Circuit's decision.
Decker v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 400 U.S. 955 (1971), rehearing
denied 40 1 U .S. 950 (1971). In law, a split decision furnishes no guiding
precedent. It did, however, lead the drafters of the Federal Rules of
Evidence to drop their proposal to add the control group test to the
Rules, leaving the matter open. Congress thereafter decided not to
include specific rules of privilege in the Federal Rules, with the result
that further elucidation of the scope of the federal corporate attorneyclient privilege was relegated (along with federal privileges generally) to
case-by-case development by the courts.
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Federal courts in the 1970s usually adopted either the control group
or the subject matter test, though some courts applied variations or even
a synthesis of the two. The best-known elaboration of the subject matter
test was Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (1978),
where the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit required that for a
lower level corporate employee's communications to be privileged, they
must be made at the direction of the employee's superiors and must
cover information within the employee's duties. In addition, the court
required that the communication be made for the purpose of getting
legal services for the corporation and be kept confidential within the
corporation. The court reasoned that these requirements would limit the
privilege to legitimate attorney-client communications as opposed to
regular business dealings, thus taking care of some of the concerns that
had led courts to adopt the control-group approach.
This brings us to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Upjohn, which was a classic application of the control group
test. The court spoke about the difficulties of extending the attorneyclient privilege to Upjohn's lower-echelon employees because the privilege's protections were based on the "intimate relationship" between an
individual and his lawyer. The court also questioned the effectiveness of
the subject matter test, voicing concern that corporate counsel would
become the dumping ground for incriminating facts and that corporate
executives would be able to shield themselves from information about
possibly illegal transactions. In the specific context of Upjohn, the court
also noted the severe burden that the questioning of large numbers of
foreign citizens would place on the IRS . Concluding that the subject
matter test would create the potential for a broad "zone of silence," the
court applied the narrower control group test and held that the bulk of
the questionnaire answers, letters, and interviews in Upjohn did not
meet it.
The court's "shielding" or "dumping" point deserves a closer look,
because it is a mainstay in cases that rejected the subject matter test.
The worry is that if communications with field employees are privileged,
corporations will be encouraged to structure things in such a way that
illegal conduct could be planned or perpetrated by lower echelon employees and discussed by them with corporate lawyers-who might aid the
effort or at least keep quiet about it. The information would be funneled
to the lawyer and stop there, or be routed through counsel to other lower
level employees needed for the scheme, without informing, and hence
shielding, upper management. People outside the business would have
trouble discovering it. Nor could they discover whether the lawyer told
upper management about it. Senior executives could thereby insulate
themselves from the wrongdoing and would have "plausible deniability".
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They could turn a blind eye with impunity. They would have little
incentive to take corrective measures.
But, it may be asked, wouldn't the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege curtail privilege in this nefarious scenario? Wouldn't
a requirement that a lower-level employee must be authorized by someone in authority, to communicate with the lawyer tend to mitigate the
problem of management deniability? Isn't such a requirement an integral part of the subject-matter test? For example, in Upjohn itself, the
Chairman of the Board authorized Thomas's inquiry and directed the
employees to communicate with Thomas on the matter. Surely Thomas
would have to report back to executives on the results. Thus, it is hard to
see how the executives could have shielded themselves . Nevertheless,
there is something to the court's concern. How major a problem it is, and
how determinative it should be, was part of the debate that was the
backdrop for the next stage in Upjohn: the Supreme Court decision.

THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN UPJOHN
Thomas sat in the audience during the argument in the Supreme
Court. He liked it that no one in the audience knew who he was or that
he was the central character behind the arguments they were witnessing. What he and the audience saw were two of the nation 's top Supreme
Court advocates squaring off against each other. Both were well known
to the Justices as fine lawyers, having appeared before them many times.
The two therefore had a certain cache with the Court.
Arguing for the government was Lawrence Wallace, a senior career
attorney with the U.S . Solicitor General's Office. That office, known as
" the Government's Law Firm,'' handles virtually all the federal government's work before the Supreme Court, and many other important
government appellate cases. The Solicitor General has been called the
" Tenth Justice " because of the extra credibility that office has in the
eyes of the Court. Wallace had worked, ironically, for Covington &
Burling immediately following law school. A few years later, he joined
the Solicitor General's Office, intending to stay two or three years, but
wound up staying 35 years, as deputy to ten Solicitors General, through
the administrations of eight presidents beginning with President Lyndon
J ohnson. He had a steady diet of Supreme Court cases. At six feet tall
and 200 pounds, with a machine-gun-like, slightly pedantic, extraordinarily confident delivery, Wallace was truly formidable .
On Upjohn 's and Thomas 's side was Covington & Burling's Dan
Gribbon . Slim, wirey, distinguished, of moderate height, with sparse
hair, Gribbon is described by Wallace as " having a style of argument
that was at once friendly, warm, personable, and supremely competent",
and by Thomas as " physically looking exactly the way a Washington
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lawyer and partner at Covington & Burling should look". Thomas was
struck by the fact that Gribbon, during his oral argument, seemed to
welcome-indeed, enthusiastically embraced-the toughest, potentially
most damaging and difficult questions from the Justices-especially ones
that revealed the Achilles heels of his case. Thomas would cringe at such
a question, thinking all is lost. " I am very glad you asked me that
question ," Gribbon would say, and genuinely seem to mean it. He would
go on to painstakingly and thoroughly answer the question . He knew
that any question represents a problem in the mind of the Justice who
asks it, and could well be a deciding factor. Thus he viewed questions as
golden opportunities to get inside the minds of the Justices and resolve
their problems favorably. His advance preparation, including mooting
before other lawyers in the firm , always seemed to have anticipated the
question and supplied him with the best answer possible. Thomas
reports that Gribbon 's performance was stunning. Thomas knew that
Gribbon 's daughter, a law student, was in the audience and must have
felt very proud of her dad. Today she is a federal judge.
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals ' decision, holding
that the " control group" test applied by the Court of Appeals was too
narrow and overlooked the needs of the lawyer to gather information
from whomever within the corporation has the information necessary to
enable the lawyer to render fully-informed and therefore sound legal
advice-which sound advice serves the public interest in a number of
ways. Justice (later Chief Justice) Rehnquist who wrote the opinion for
the Court mentioned the need for predictability and certainty as an
important reason for discarding the control group test. Nevertheless, to
the disappointment of many lawyers and scholars the decision in its
concluding passages declined to (in its own words) " lay down a broad
rule or series of rules to govern all conceivable future questions in this
area" and instead said courts should determine the issue on a case-bycase basis.
Although the Upjohn case presented legal questions almost identical
to those that had divided the Court in Harper & Row a decade earlier,
this time the Supreme Court had little trouble with the issue, unanimously rejecting the control group test as applied by the Court of
Appeals below. Wallace (the advocate from the Solicitor General 's Office)
reports that he did not think the case was that open-and-shut, and was
surprised not to garner even a single vote among the Justices.
In the first part of the opinion, Justice Rehnquist established that
the purpose of the attorney-client privilege was to encourage complete
and honest communication between attorneys and their clients. He cited
cases dating as far back as the 1880s, concluding that this purpose
applied equally well regardless of whether the client was an individual or
a corporation.

170

THE STORY OF UPJOHN CO. u. UNITED STATES

He then turned his attention to flaws in the control group test.
First, he criticized the control group test for failing to further the
original aims of the attorney-client privilege. The control group test's
emphasis on the employee's ability to act on legal advice from counsel
did not provide enough protection to encourage a sufficient flow of
important information to the attorney. Rather, it inhibited it by restricting the privilege to a small group within the corporation. The Court
rea oned that without vital facts possessed by non-control group employee , t he corporation would be left without effective legal counsel. Second,
the upreme Court faulted the control group test's " Robson 's choice":
t he lawyer could either interview non-control group employees without
the protection of the attorney-client privilege or refrain from interviewing them, leaving the company with only a partial understanding of the
fact of the case. Even if a lawyer could formulate a legal opinion
without talking to low-level employees, " the control group test made it
more difficult to convey full and frank legal advice " to the lower level
employees who would put the policy into effect. Third, the decision
criticized the control group test for its unpredictability, pointing out that
contrary decisions in cases applying the control group test showed the
test's inherent arbitrariness concerning who is in the control group. The
Court reasoned that some degree of certainty is essential to encourage
the free flow of information and that without this knowledge the
privilege would be ineffectual.
The final part of the Court's analysis applied these principles to the
facts in the case. The Court restated what it considered to be the key
facts : the communications were made by Upjohn employees to counsel at
the direction of corporate superiors; Upjohn needed the communications
as a basis for legal advice; the employees were sufficiently aware that
they were being questioned so that the corporation could receive legal
advice; the communications concerned matters within the scope of the
employees' duties; and Upjohn kept the communications highly confidential. The Court concluded that protecting the communications was
consistent with the underlying purposes of the attorney-client privilege.
On the other side of the scales, Rehnquist gave relatively short
shrift to the notion that a broad privilege hinders the discovery of truth
by making evidence unavailable. He noted that all it renders unavailable
is the communications themselves, which would probably not be made if
privilege did not cover them. So there would be little net loss. This is
because the privilege does not prevent discovery of the underlying facts,
even though they may have been recounted in the communications. The
IRS could still summon or subpoena the employees themselves to get the
facts; it could just not learn what they said to the lawyer about the facts .
While independently questioning the witnesses might be relatively difficult or expensive, it is no more so than if the communications had never
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been made. Indeed, Rehnquist seemed hostile to the notion that difficulty and expense to the government are valid considerations at all when
discussing the privilege.
Some commentators have since wondered whether Rehnquist was
too facile in this whole argument that extending the privilege entails
little loss to discovering truth. The fact is, communications sometimes
are-and perhaps were in this case-made for other reasons than privilege. And questioning witnesses independently is not entirely satisfactory. They may not be as truthful with investigators as with the lawyer,
and it might be useful both substantively and for impeachment purposes
for the government to have the statements made to the lawyer.
At any rate, based on his reasoning, Justice Rehnquist held, for the
Court, that the privilege extended to communications of the lower
echelon employees here. But he strictly limited the decision to Upjohn 's
facts. This was meant to prevent lower courts from thinking that the
Court implicitly embraced the subject matter test as elaborated in
Diversified Industries. The Court also did not make any attempt to set
forth rules or guidelines for determining the scope of the corporate
attorney-client privilege. This was striking given the growing acceptance
of the subject matter test in the federal courts and the fact that Chief
Justice Burger, behind the scenes, was pushing for the Court to adopt a
modified subject matter test as indicated in his concurring opinion. The
opinion of the Court, however, was confined to a narrow holding that the
control group test did not govern the development of the law of the
attorney-corporate client privilege, and left future development to the
lower courts.6
Some have faulted Rehnquist's opinion on the grounds that, in
failing to adopt a concrete test, and in mentioning a number of pivotal
features of the communication that might not always be ascertainable at
the time of the communication, Rehnquist promotes the very uncertainty he decried-uncertainty of application of the privilege, that will
discourage full and frank communication. But others felt these same
things constitute strengths: The pivotal features that the communications should have if they are to be privileged, gives clear indication to
communicators of what will likely be and not be privileged. Refusing to
adopt a definitive test leaves desirable flexibility to determine, in an
extraordinary case, that the privilege is being used to provide too great a
zone of silence or for other improper purposes.
6 The decision also held th at work-product protection applies to IRS sum monses, and
that the lower court had applied the wrong sta ndard for overcoming such protection. The
Supreme Cou rt said mental impressions of the attorney may never be discoverable or may
be discoverable only on a sign ificantly heightened standa rd of need. The Court fe lt that it
need not be more specific because its ruling on a ttorney-client privilege was largely
dispositive of the case .
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SUBSEQUENT EVENTS AND EFFECTS OF UPJOHN.
Subsequent Developments in the Case.
Rehnquist's decision technically remanded the case to the lower
courts for proceedings consistent with the decision. No one remembers
precisely what happened on remand, since they all felt the ball game was
over after the Supreme Court decision. There are no records of any
subsequent judicial proceedings in any lower court concerning the case.
To the best anyone can recollect, the IRS saw the handwriting on the
wall after the Upjohn decision, and got together with Upjohn to settle
the case. The available evidence suggests that, since the Supreme
Court's decision effectively privileged most of the communications at
issue, the settlement was based on the portions of material voluntarily
disclosed by Upjohn for which no privilege had been claimed, and on IRS
interviews with some witnesses on their personal knowledge that was
not covered by privilege. The IRS and Upjohn agreed that a relatively
modest payment would be made by the company with essentially no
adverse impact on the company or any of its employees. They agreed, as
Upjohn had done with the SEC, that policies would be adopted by
Upjohn (which had already substantially been done) to prevent similar
problems in the future. Henceforth foreign payments would have to meet
certain legal parameters and be handled in a certain way on tax returns.
Thomas recalls that much of this mirrored what the IRS by this time
had worked out with other companies regarding foreign payments.

Subsequent Developments in the Law of Corporate Attorney-Client
Pri vilege.
Despite Rehnquist's care in Upjohn only to negate a test centering
on the control group and not to set forth any alternative test, lower
federal courts (and those state courts that choose to follow Upjohn )7 have
tended nevertheless to read the opinion as establishing something very
akin to the Diversified Industries version of the subject matter test for
all cases in which a claim of federal corporate attorney-client privilege is
raised. The Supreme Court should not be surprised. Rehnquist's enum eration in Upjohn, of the significant features of the privileged Upjohn
communications-corresponding almost identically to the features
deemed controlling under the subject matter test in Diversified Industries-could have been expected to be elevated to the status of a " test"
by lower courts, who are, as a rule, eager for guidance, generally timid,
7 A dwi ndl ing number of sta te courts still a pply a control group test . The Uniform
Rules of E vidence, recomm ended to the states by the National Co nfe rence of Commissioners on Un ifo rm State La ws and by the Ameri can Bar Association, incorporated the subjectma tter test into its a ttorney-client pri vilege provision, after the Upjohn decision by means
of a n a mendment, upon which I was advisor .
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and anxious to stay well within any parameters set by the Supreme
Court.
Effect of Upjohn on Corporations and Corporate Law Practice.
Corporate lawyers generally agree that after Upjohn there was more
confiding in corporate attorneys (both in-house and outside counsel) ,
which enhanced their ability to obtain information and render good legal
advice, sometimes enabling them to spot and stop illegal conduct more
easily, as Justice Rehnquist hoped. Indeed, the Thomas saga proves this
can and does happen . The degree to which it does is an open question.
Although Upjohn remains intact today, some lawyers believe that
recent and accelerating trends among legislators, regulators, other enforcement authorities, and corporations themselves, threaten to undermine the decision's intended effectiveness in encouraging the flow of
information to corporate lawyers. These trends-many of them expressly
designed to penalize or circumvent claims of attorney-client privilegebecame intensified after Upjohn and seem at least in part to be a
reaction to the broad scope Upjohn gave the privilege. Enforcement
agencies and some politicians felt that something must be done about
the way the privilege impedes the discovery and investigation of corporate wrongdoing-particularly after the 2001 Enron scandal fueled voters' thirst for punishing corporate miscreants. The public believed-with
some justification-that lawyers had contributed to the problem or at
least had kept quiet out of allegiance to their clients. Regarding as
difficult any direct attempts to overturn Upjohn or the attorney-client
privilege generally, Congress, regulators, and law enforcement agencies
instead began increasingly to adopt measures to get around them. These
measures and some corporate trends exacerbating them fall into four
categories:
(1) The Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In 2002, in direct response to Enron
and associated debacles, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
named after the primary legislators who sponsored it. Among other
provisions, the Act empowers the SEC to adopt rules regulating lawyers
who handle SEC matters for publicly traded companies or companies
registered or filing with the SEC. This covers most major American
companies and any lawyers who advise on or handle matters that might
potentially involve the SEC-a wide range of matters indeed, because of
broad SEC disclosure requirements. Almost any matter of substance a
lawyer might handle for such a company probably has potential disclosure implications, and thus subjects the lawyer to the SEC regulations.
The SEC has now adopted regulations pursuant to this statutory
authorization. Some of these permit or require a lawyer to do certain
things if she becomes aware of credible evidence of a material past,
future, or ongoing illegal act by or within the corporation that would

174

THE STORY OF UPJOHN CO. v. UNITED STATES

constitute fraud or a securities, fiduciary, or similar violation. She must
report it " up the ladder" within the corporation-that is, to the Chief
Legal Officer or even the Chief Executive Officer or the Board of
Directors 8 if necessary- and request a response. This mandatory " up the
ladder " disclosure is designed to overcome the problem of isolating top
executives from wrongdoing that decisions adopting the "control group"
view thought was endemic to the broader "subject matter" view ultimately embraced by Upjohn. The " up the ladder" reporting would not
violate the privilege or customary legal ethics notions of confidentiality,
because it is r eporting within the client, not to the outside, but it could
worry employees speaking to lawyers.
If the response from the top of the ladder is unsatisfactory, the
lawyer is allowed if she wishes to report the wrongdoing and the
unsatisfactory response to the SEC. This provision is intended to relieve
h er of customary malpractice liability for breaching confidentiality. Such
r eporting to someone outside the client would seem to violate both the
privilege and the confidentiality requirements contained in the ethics
rules of many jurisdictions-at least if the wrongdoing is past rather
than current, continuing, or proposed, which might be within the crimefraud exception to the privilege. Since lawyers are licensed to practice in
a particular jurisdiction, that jurisdiction's local ethics rules would
normally govern counsel. But the new SEC regulations supersede state
ethics rules, at least until there is a successful challenge to such
superseding on constitutional grounds. Some state ethics rules, rules
recommended by the American Bar Association, and the Restatement's
Law of Lawyers, have also recently been amended to allow, or even
sometimes require, reporting by lawyers to outside persons or entities, of
seriou s wrongdoing by clients. Some of these provisions apply only where
the wrongdoing may involve death or bodily injury, but some go beyond
this to substantial financial or property harm, or, specifically, business
fraud or securities violations (in the wake of Enron).
How do all these new disclosure provisions-and particularly those
under Sarbanes-Oxley-affect the premise of Upjohn that employees will
frankly communicate with the corporate attorney if they are covered by
the corporation's privilege? Would the employees talking to Gerry Thomas h ave been less forthcoming if they thought Thomas might reveal what
t hey said to corporate superiors or to law enforcers under these new
8 The trend in the post-Enron era, spa rked by legal reforms a nd by heightened public
a nd busin ess sensitivities, has been for boards of directors to be comprised of more people
who are independent of ma nagement, a nd who are much less protective of employees
implicated in possible wrongdoing, than was the case in the Upjo hn era. They are more
pro ne to terminate such employees or turn them in . This is one of the purposes of the " up
t he ladder " reporting requirement: to produce " transparency" a nd " house cleaning' ', as it
is called.
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provisions?9 Unlikely, since they would have expected top management
to learn of their reports, and they spoke in an environment where it was
unclear whether they, as lower-echelon employees, were covered by the
privilege at all. But there were special circumstances of trust between
Thomas and the employees, and most of them did not think they were
doing anything wrong. 10 It seems likely that at least in some circumstances today, some employees might be more hesitant to disclose selfdamaging material they thought might expose them to civil or criminal
liability, or to embarrassment or job reprisals, if they thought material
could be revealed under these new provisions. 11 The objective of Upjohn,
to encourage disclosure by employees, to the corporation's lawyer, is
undermined to that extent.
(2) The Spread and Enhancement of Sporkin 's Voluntary Co-operation Policy. The program of leniency started by SEC enforcement head
Stanley Sporkin, that treats more leniently those who come forward and
cooperate with an investigation, is now increasingly found in a wide
array of regulatory and law enforcement agencies and the Department of
Justice . In addition, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for crimes, including
corporate crimes, now give credit that lowers the sentence for cooperation with the prosecuting authority.
Under most of these programs, there is an accelerating tendency
today, which did not exist then, to treat those persons and entities who
will not waive their attorney-client privilege or work-product protection,
as failing to co-operate and therefore disentitled to leniency. 12 Many
lawyers believe this is a " gun to the head" requiring waiver. The greater
the potential penalty, the greater the incentive to waive and get leniency.
With today's corporations, the penalties can be huge. What makes things
worse for the waiving party, is the fact that a waiver as to one agency
waives as to the whole world, regarding the same (and sometimes
related) material, unless a court subscribes to the "selective waiver"
doctrine, which few do.13
9 Thomas wo uld probab ly have had a n ethical duty to warn them of thi , but they
might have been aware anyway.

IO They might have thought twice abo ut revealing to a post-Enron board of directors,
though. See note 8, supra.
11 Since under t he majority view in courts today, there is no notion of " selective
waiver " of privilege, it may well be that t he di sclosure, once made to the SEC, could not be
confin ed to the SEC. This would make the risks of talking even greater for the employees.
A lawyer probably should warn of this too . Wi th all these warnings, a fra nk discussion is
exceedin gly unlikely.
12 The Justice Department's policy regarding waiver expressly emphasizes the desirability of waiver of a business entity's attorney-client a nd work-product protections, clearly
evidencing an impatience with the Upjohn decision.
13 The failure of most courts to recognize selective waiver, limiting t he waiver to the
agency receiving the disclosure, can, on occasion , redu ce the incentive to waive by
increasing the prospect of civil liability asserted by private pla intiffs.
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The Upjohn employees knew when they were speaking with Thomas
that he was not their personal attorney, and therefore the privilege was
not theirs, but rather the corporation's, to raise or waive.14 Again we
may ask, would they have confided so readily to Thomas if they thought
there might later be these incentives on the part of the company itself to
broadly waive its privilege? Maybe they would have because of the
special circumstances of trust and their belief they were doing nothing
wrong. But today it seems likely that some corporate employees would be
r eluctant to confide potentially self-damaging or self-incriminating information , in view of the waiver incentives operating on the company.15
Would employees necessarily know about these incentives when confiding in a corporate counsel? In view of the frequency of waiver today,
probably yes. Anyway, a lawyer in today's regulatory environment probably would have an ethical duty to alert them to the potential for
di closure, especially if they risked bearing personally civil or criminal
liability. To this extent, too, then, Upjohn is weakened. 16
(3) The Changing Allegiances of Corporations Today. Thomas got
the information he needed in considerable measure because the employees kn ew and trusted the company and its management and felt they
would be protected if push came to shove, as in fact happened. But a look
14 T homas on the Upjohn facts probably could not ethically have represented both,
even if he wa nted to because of the potential for severe (and probably un waivable) conflicts
of interest.
15 Additional waiver incentives for the corporation a rise because, in t his post-Enron
era, independent auditors and audit committees, having been burned by liability for Enrontype derelictions, will often refu se to certify the accuracy of a company's finan cials, as
required fo r the compa ny to do business, unless the company allows full examination by
the auditors even of attorney-client privileged or work-product protected material which, as
indicated he rein , usually means there is a waiver of privilege or protection regarding
anyone who thereafter seeks this or related information . Worse still, from t he corporation 's
and employees ' standpoint, merely furnishing a report of an internal investigation to
auditors or government agencies, has been held by some courts today to waive attorneyclient and wo rk-product protections coverin g underlying materials a nd con versations,
e pecially if t he furni shing was to obtain a certification or leniency. In part, this represents
a post-E n ro n extension of the older principle that a party can use a privilege as a "shield
but not a sword "-th at is, if one affirm atively uses material , one cannot prevent the
exploration of its bone-lides by asse rtin g pri vilege.

Addi tional fa r-reaching wa iver incentives to the corporation, are presented by the fact
that, post-E nro n, the stock excha nges (NYSE and NASDAQ) co nduct vigorous investigations and have adopted policies requi ring co-operation a nd (sometimes) waiver similar to
those described here fo r government age ncies.
16 Further deterring employees from mak ing statements to t he corporate lawyer, is the
fact that t here have been cases in which the Ju stice Depar t ment has regarded statements
made by employees to corporate lawyers in a corporation's own internal investigation as
obstruction-of-justice, which is a crime if the Depa rtment feels t he state ments a re purposely inaccurate. The t heory is that co rporate internal investigations now play a role in law
enforcemen t under the new cooperation policies.
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at the business section of newspapers today reveals a much higher rate
of corporate turnover. Companies are bought, sold, merged, or taken
over, and new management comes in that doesn't have the same stake in
defending against wrongdoing that occurred under a previous management or predecessor corporation. Sometimes the public image and legal
posture of the new management or entity is better served by taking their
lumps and confessing that the old crowd were miscreants, but "we are
different". In fact, recently, many years after Upjohn, the Upjohn
Company itself was taken over by the Pharmacia Company, which in
turn was taken over by the Pfizer Company, its current incarnation.
Dr.William Erastus Upjohn 's family company no longer exists.17 Corporations also go bankrupt more frequently these days, and are taken over
and managed by a trustee in bankruptcy who may have no special
allegiance to the old employees.
Because the privilege belongs to the company and not to the employee who confides information, the privilege can be waived by the company, by a successor corporation or by a trustee in bankruptcy. This means
that even a company's CEO cannot count on his confidential communications to the corporation 's attorneys remaining forever private. Given an
environment of changing companies and management, where personal
trust and loyalty are muted, no employee can be sure that he will not be
" hung out to dry" by existing or new management. 18 Employees at all
levels may therefore be reluctant to talk candidly to corporate attorneys.
(4) Expansion of the Privilege's Crime-Fraud Exception and Related
Doctrines. If the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege is
determined by a court to apply, a privileged conversation can be stripped
of its privilege. There is a marked modern tendency to expand the crimefraud exception. 19 For example, traditionally the crime-fraud exception
applied only where legal advice was sought or obtained by the client for
the purpose of committing or facilitating an on-going or future crime or
fraud , as opposed to seeking legal advice concerning past crimes. The
latter kind of advice, e.g., advice directed at preparing defenses for a
crime one has already committed, has been considered squarely within
the professional functioning of a lawyer and is privileged.
17 There is something sadly nostalgic about the passing of the compa ny (Upjohn) that
was responsi ble for such important drugs (whose na mes became household words) as
Cheracol , Kaopectate, Methylprednisalone (the most commonly used low do e steroid fo r
infl ammation), and Orinase (the most widely used dia betes drug a nd the fi rst capable of
oral adm inistration).

l8

Or the existing or new board of directors. See note 8.

19 Some

lawyers report a corresponding upsurge in insta nces where regu lators a nd law
enforcement authorities a re form a lly cha rging la wyers with pa rticipation in t heir client's
crime.
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There is, however , an increasing tendency today for r egulators,
enforce ment authorities, and courts, to blur the line between these
temporal categories. They take the position that legal efforts related to
past crimes are often really efforts to keep past crimes from coming to
light, and therefore they amount to a conspiracy to cover-up or further
deceive. This makes them a continuing crime, within the crime-fraud
exception . The tendency is particularly marked in the corporate context,
where there is an obligation to r eport to the SEC and investors any
events (even past crimes and frauds) that may result in liabilities of the
company. The failure to report is a continuing crime or fraud for as long
a t he initial wrongdoing is not r eported or is r eported incorrectly or
insufficiently. The problem is escalated by the fact that in today's highly
regulated business environment, things that did not seem to be crimes at
t he time of a communication may be regarded as crimes later by a court.
To the extent ther e are increased chances that the crime-fraud
exception might apply, employees confiding to the corporate attorney
will think twice about what they reveal, because a court may subsequently find that their revelations are not privileged, even if the company tries to protect the employee and asserts the privilege.
Further fu eling the modern trends that increase the risk of the
crim e-fraud exception applying, is a progressive erosion of the quantum
of proof required to show that the exception applies. Few courts require
that it be proved by even a preponderance of evidence. Most r equire only
a " prima facie case"-often defined in this area as a showing that would
justify a reasonable person in thinking that a crime or fraud may be
involved, without receiving counter-evidence or hearing, cross examination or impeachment of the witnesses who make out the prima facie case
or any other appraisal of their credibility. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court h as h eld that a judge may hear or inspect in camera the allegedly
privileged communication, on a lesser showing than n eeded to establish
the crime-fraud exception, in order to determine the applicability of the
crim e-fraud exception, and may consider the contents of the communication in deciding whether the crime-fraud exception applies to the communication . The courts, while applying fairly constant word formulas
describing these various burdens of proof, have been requiring less and
less to satisfy them.
If this is not enough to erode the privilege, some courts are expanding the crime-fraud exception to include more wrongdoing than just
crimes and fraud- for example, other torts. There is also a tendency for
courts, when they find a crime or fraud , to broadly strip all communications between the client and lawyer of the privilege, even those communications that h ad n othing to do with the crime or fraud .
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In view of these enlargements of the crime-fraud exception, employees communicating with corporate counsel today cannot have the confidence they once had that attorney-client privilege will be sacrosanct. 20 It
is likely that some of their communications will be chilled.

Whether these four numbered " inroads" on the encouragement to
communicate envisioned in Upjohn prove to be well-advised or illadvised, most of them seem to stem from a somewhat more jaundiced
view of the benefits of lawyer-client confidentiality than Upjohn expressed. While Upjohn did recognize that there must be qualifications on
an unadulterated policy of confidentiality, and clearly allowed for the
development of such qualifications, nevertheless, to most lawyers, Upjohn is a soaring endorsement of the lawyer-client privilege and the work
lawyers do.

* * *
In listening to Thomas talk about Upjohn today, you get a strong
sense that he is most proud of the fact that he kept the faith with the
employees. He is also very pleased that in the process he secured a
decision that vindicates the role he always tried to play as corporate
counsel, and that he believes most corporate counsel play-the role of
helping the modern corporation do its work, which he believes generally
is in the public interest. He believes corporate lawyers need to get
information from employees at every level, in order to perform their role
effectively. He is of the conviction that most corporations-by no means
all-are good citizens and try to comply with the complex laws and
regulations to which they are subject, and that fully informed corporate
counsel play an indispensable part in that compliance. Next to his
family, and perhaps his war experiences, you get the feeling t hat he
regards Upjohn as a defining event in his life and the capstone of his
career. He clearly enjoyed almost every minute of it, except perhaps
when he was jailed in Egypt.
20 There are also other attorney-client privil ege doctrines that are being u ed to defeat
a company's effort to assert attorney-client privilege to protect their employees commu nications. These include penetrating the privilege by dissident share holders in certain instances; and the doctrine that the fun ction the attorney was performin g for the company when
he garnered the communication was not a professiona l legal function but rather a bu iness
fun ction- i. e., one that was predominantly motivated by business rather than legal
concerns-and therefore it could have been done by so meone who is not a lawyer . The risk
of this last doctrine being used is highest wh en the attorney wear s several " hats " in the
company-th at is, he is not only the company's lawyer, but is also on the board of or is a n
executive offi cer (other than legal officer) of the company, as Thomas was.

*

